Posts Tagged ‘legal’

Relationship “contracts” need to be based on our inability to predict the future.

Continuing to think about early stage investment structures to “enable flexibility, create more intermediate decisions and tie payments to actions, not to negotiations” in a world where we are increasingly “unaware of the long-term implications of our short-term decisions”

Originally posted as a comment by Brooks Jordan in response to Venture capital is not broken. But it could use an alternate incentive structure.:

… I love your articulation of the fundamental problem (which absolutely exists):

“. . . how can investors and consultants help entrepreneurs start businesses and get fairly compensated for the value they create?”

Your third goal also jumps out at me:

“Create structures that enable flexibility, create more intermediate decisions and tie payments to actions, not to negotiations.”

And your proposed solutions have got me really thinking about what it would take to create a contract to support these goals.

You’ve hit on such an important issue. Starting-up a business is inherently uncertain, but the potential value is the natural counter-balance, so how do we share the risk and rewards of the germination phase given different types and amounts of investment?

If we had a new type of contract, as you’re suggesting, to allow a consultant or freelancer to “invest” in the company with services as well as allow others to make small seed investments in such a way that they could be compensated as the business matured and revealed itself, that allowed them to ante up or cash out or trade that value horizontally (other investors at their “level”) or vertically (with angel or VC investments), then it would allow for a lot of tinkering and innovation that’s not happening now.

I want it! :)

There must be some kind of cash/debt/equity structure, some of which I’m sure is contained in your post, that can make it a reality.

Perhaps it’s time to refresh my previous thoughts on creating cash + equity + debt structures for entrepreneurs, investors and consultants by focusing on the goals rather the (admittedly overly complex) mechanisms.

Relationship “contracts” need to be based on our inability to predict the future; our current legal structures and contracts were based on a world where we fooled ourselves about the quality of our predictions.

Financial structures need rebooting; legal structures need hacking; tomorrow’s world can’t look like today’s; in all of these cases, change is good.

Returning to the false reality of the past invites disaster; believing the “doom and gloom” predictions of the future stifles innovation and dampens our near- and long-term future; our actions today will shape the models, structures and incentives of the future. Let’s pay very close attention to what we’re creating.

Venture capital is not broken. But it could use an alternate incentive structure.

Summary
Much of the “venture capital is dead / broken” cacophony focuses on how most angel and venture capital investors have been unable to adapt their investment and operational models to fit the new economics available to many entrepreneurs. Perhaps we just need an alternate investment structure to align incentives and economic models.

Not a replacement, but an alternative for some situations. Instead of accepting what is, let’s think about what could be.

Feedback Requested: A Flexible Structure for Partnering with Entrepreneurs

Conversations around the best structures for pre-venture capital Series A investments often focus on convertible debt and preferred equity. It’s not a simple question: the “best” structure really depends on the specific situation and often comes down to a value judgment over which structure is more “fair” or “easy”.

Structures create incentives; perhaps what the venture industry needs is an alternate model to align incentives and economic models.

In response to a couple business opportunities I’ve been evaluating, I’ve been playing around with some ideas for an investment and compensation structure that could work for the type of fluid investor, consultant and entrepreneurs partnering relationships that new organizational and economic models are making more possible and more common.

Goals

  • The fundamental problem: how can investors and consultants help entrepreneurs start businesses and get fairly compensated for the value they create?
  • Establish the rules and create more interactions: what’s the hardest problem in starting a new venture? What decisions need to be made in the beginning?
  • Create structures that enable flexibility, create more intermediate decisions and tie payments to actions, not to negotiations.
  • Allow consultants and investors to contribute as needed to help entrepreneurs.

Structure
The structure has two key parts to create compensation and investment agreements for investors / consultants and entrepreneurs:

1) Compensation: Convertible Preferred Shares granted under a Kudos Model.

  • Convertible Non-Participating Preferred Shares.
  • Granted by the entrepreneur to the consultant / investor under a version of a Kudos Model: the entrepreneur selects the number of shares to grant every three months based on their estimate of the value created over the past three months. The entrepreneur cannot retract granted shares.
  • Shares are priced at $X per share (price TBD: set at same for all shares).
  • Share holder holds the decision to convert (portion or all) of shares to 1) Equity at next qualified investment round or 2) Convertible Debt at any time under the terms in the instrument detailed below.
  • Shares are convertible at 1:1 ratio for shares bought by the next investor at the next round (common, preferred or whatever form of equity negotiated).
  • “Next round” traditional VC sets the pricing and terms of the shares.
  • The shares vest immediately.
  • Cash compensation: the holder of the shares holds the option to be paid cash compensation whenever the company reports a cash flow positive month (or whenever the entrepreneur draws cash from the business), commensurate with the share holder’s % equity ownership of the company. Repayment will reduce the amount of Preferred Stock held by the Consultant / Investor. E.g. if the preferred stock holder owns 10% of the granted shares in the overall company, whenever the entrepreneur draws cash compensation from the business the preferred stock holder will be paid 10% of the cash compensation.

2) Investment: Convertible Debt

  • Consultant / investor invests capital into the business through a convertible note.
  • Note carries an interest rate of 10%. Interest is not paid as cash but is added to the contributed capital in the note.
  • Multiple closings: the note is “open” for continued investment for one year from date of issue. This is so that the investor can continue to gauge progress and invest money into the business depending on capital needs and continued interest and commitment to the business.
  • The note converts at a discount to the conversion price on the next round. The discount will be a maximum of 25% (five percent per month, depending on how long it takes to close the financing, up to the maximum) off of the per share price.
  • Debt repayment: the holder of the convertible debt holds the option to be repaid portions of the debt whenever the company reports a cash flow positive month (or whenever the entrepreneur draws cash from the business). Repayment will be X% of the positive cash flow or X% of the cash flow drawn by the entrepreneur (% TBD, to be negotiated).
  • No personal guarantee of the note by the entrepreneur.
  • Weighted average anti-dilution protection.
  • Investor holds the right to participate equally (pro-rata) in further investment rounds under the same terms as the next investors.
  • Basic protective provisions: no pre-payment of the note by the Entrepreneur, pre-specified payment if there is a change of control prior to a venture round, and a cap on the amount of additional debt a company can take.

Other Terms:

  • Financial statements: entrepreneur is required to send a monthly CEO update; unaudited financial statements available upon request.

Starting the conversation…

  • A little confusing? Perhaps.

    As you think through the terms and the necessary improvements, consider one of my basic thoughts: How can we let continuous interactions and decisions, rather than scheduled commitments, determine the flow of attention, talent, time and capital? How can we introduce elements of game theory into our investment and operating structures?

  • Valuation: Why aren’t the convertible shares or the convertible debt properly priced to a % ownership of the company at the time of grant or issuance?

    Establishing valuation at this stage really isn’t worth it. The intention is to push the valuation decision to when all parties have more information.

  • Can’t the entrepreneur choose to “underpay” the consultant / investor by not granting enough shares?

    Yes, but that will make the working relationship pretty short, and that’s probably not in anyone’s interest.

  • What if the entrepreneur will never be able to sell the business or achieve a qualified investment?

    The consultant / investor has the continuing option to take cash or hold shares; if the business turns out to be a cash-flow based business, then the consultant / investor will want to convert their ownership into whichever instrument maximizes their return.

    Yes, that means the investment may turn out to just be a loan.

  • Keeping an accurate share register is very, very important to track the conversion options and current shares / debt structure.

    No question. And while this is a bit more complex, is it anything more than a couple extra lines in our Excel models?

  • Why are the grant timelines set for every three months? Why don’t the grants only occur at investment rounds?

    Because for some “lifestyle” startups there may never be qualified investment rounds; the economic models simply won’t fit. Why three months? No particular reason, open for ideas.

  • This is way more complex than the typical convertible debt or preferred equity structure; investors, entrepreneurs and lawyers understand those agreements and this type of agreement will create large legal costs for investors and entrepreneurs. Legal agreements are already too large of a transaction cost (time, money and focus) in starting businesses.

    Really? Seriously? We are nowhere close to a set of industry standard documents. A huge variety of structural decisions, terms and clauses are negotiated on a case-by-case basis. Legal fees are a pretty hefty transaction cost in raising capital and and creating option / equity structures. Is this really that much harder to structure?

    The goal of this idea is to create a standard structure and a set of interactions and less-standard decisions after the agreements are signed and the business starts, instead of focusing on the decisions before the business starts. Legal agreements are important; let’s help figure out ways to get them done sooner and quicker to let people start creating businesses.

    In addition, this structure effectively “punts” on many decisions and pushes the negotiations over pricing and other terms to the next investors, the next round or the later stages of the company, at which point the entrepreneurs and investors will be in better position to pay the necessary transaction costs and additional investors will be involved to help set terms.

  • We (investor and entrepreneur) know exactly how we’re going to work together, how we’re going to balance our time and capital contributions and how the business will make money for both of us.

    If you know all of that, awesome.

    But there’s a good chance you don’t, and a better chance you’ll be wrong.

    Why create a structure that won’t allow you to adapt and change your relationship, time commitments and capital contributions over time?

Disclaimers

  • It’s not meant to work for all situations. It probably won’t work for traditional angels or venture capital investors: in my mind it is best suited for the $0 to $100K “friends and family” pre-seed stages. But more importantly, it might work for consultants / investors and entrepreneurs that need a flexible, multi-facted, non-priced investment and compensation model to fit their fluid organizational model and “the great unknowns” of the future for their businesses.
  • I’m not an expert. I’m not a VC. I’m not even an entrepreneur, really. But by sitting in the middle I see a both sides to similar arguments. I’m trying to imagine something different. Maybe I’m wrong: I’m fine with that, but I’m interested in learning why I’m wrong.
  • This is not fully baked; it’s lacking many necessary terms, covenants, warranties and representations; I haven’t introduced the “Qualified IPO” concept,or “drag-along” rights and protective provisions on sale, I’m not sure about the nature of the convertible shares and liquidation preferences (participating? preferred or common?), maximum conversion clause, there are decisions to make on share vesting schedule, anti-dilution, Board of Directors, tax implications, etc… I’m looking for the discussion to help flesh out the details, point out holes and hopefully add new ideas that may help investors, consultants and entrepreneurs.

Inspirations and Resources:

Updated: Mentioned in the Wall Street Journal online Venture Dispatch column The Daily Start-Up.

MORE: Financial Models for Entrepreneurs